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Creative industries, its critics, and some 
answers
Arguments as to just what should be included under the definition of «creative industries» 
have limited their acceptance and the adoption of suitable policies. There are opposing 
analyses and statistical categories, such as the copyright industry, the content industry, the 
cultural industry, the digital content industry, the arts and entertainment industry, etc. that 
make it difficult to gather accurate, reliable, timely data on this mega-sector. Another major 
criticism is that «creative» work is idealised and that the exporting of the concept outside its 
country of origin may be tantamount to imperialism. However, the creative industries have 
evolved in the past ten years from being limited to specific sectors to becoming seen as crea-
tive agents that can generate change and innovation, and have achieved high levels of accep-
tance and significance in many different countries.  
Las discusiones sobre qué debe incluirse bajo la definición de «industrias creativas» han limitado 
su aceptación y las políticas adecuadas. Existen categorías estadísticas y analíticas opuestas, tales 
como la industria del copyright, las industrias de contenidos, las industrias culturales, las de con-
tenido digital, las industrias de las artes y el entretenimiento, etc. que hacen muy difícil reunir 
datos precisos, fiables y oportunos sobre ese megasector. Otra importante crítica es que idealizan 
el trabajo ‘creativo’ y que la exportación del concepto fuera del país que las originó puede consti-
tuir un imperialismo implícito. Sin embargo, las industrias creativas han evolucionado en los úl-
timos diez años, pasando de estar limitadas a sectores específicos a ser consideradas agentes crea-
tivos generadores de cambio e innovación y han conseguido niveles de aceptación y relevancia 
considerables en muy distintos países.
 «Sorkuntza-industrien» definizioaren barruan zer dagoen azaltzen duten eztabaiden 
ondorioz, horien onarpena mugatu egin da, baita politika egokiak bideratzea ere. Aurrez 
aurre dauden kategoria estatistiko eta analitikoak daude, esaterako copyright-aren industria, 
edukien industriak, kultura-industriak, eduki digitalekoak, arteen eta entretenimenduaren 
industriak, etab., eta horrela oso zaila da megasektore honi buruzko datu zehatz, fidagarri eta 
egokiak biltzea. Beste kritika garrantzitsu bat ere egiten da: lan ‘sortzailea’ idealizatzen dutela 
eta kontzeptua sortu zituen herrialdetik kanpo esportatzeak inperialismo inplizitua ekar 
dezakeela. Hala ere, sorkuntza-industriek aldaketak izan dituzte azken hamar urteetan: lehen 
sektore jakin batzuetarako zeuden mugatuta, eta orain aldaketa eta berrikuntza dakarten 
sorkuntza-eragiletzat hartzen dira, eta kontuan hartzeko moduko onarpen- eta garrantzi-
mailak lortu dituzte herrialde oso ezberdinetan.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The development of the creative industries ‘proposition’ has caused a great deal 
of controversy: media, cultural and communication studies’ critique of the concept 
has been as consistent as it has been negative. The critique can derive from an anti-
statist suspicion of ‘talking to the ISAs’ (Ideological State Apparatuses) in Bennett’s 
(1998) inimitable words. There may be an in-principle opposition to ‘creativity’ 
(which can imply bourgeois individualism and essentialism) displacing ‘culture’ (in 
the classic British cultural studies tradition, code for solidarity and collectivity). For 
analysts such as Angela McRobbie (2002), there are grounded worries about the ty-
pes of work and work cultures encouraged by such discourse. At the level of political 
economy, creative industries is neo-liberalism in a pure form (Miller, 2002). 
The broader controversies raised by creative industries have had much to do with 
the fact that the policy proposition had been examined and adopted by a wide range of 
government and other actors in the ten years since the framework was first outlined by 
the British government in 1998.  The gap between the enthusiasm with which it has 
been taken up in policy circles across many parts of the world and at many levels (na-
tional, state, regional, inter-governmental), and the depth of opposition to it academi-
cally, marks it out as a major contemporary instance of the gap between policy and 
critique about which I wrote in the early 1990s (Cunningham, 1992).
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The critiques can be brought together (by, for example, Banks and O’Connor 
(2009)) under the charges of an economistic account of culture; definitional in-
coherence and the consequences for data and evidence; the utopianisation of 
‘creative’ labour; and, most dramatically for adaptation of creative industries out-
side its originating country, an implicit imperialism in the export of the notion in-
ternationally.
This paper seeks to respond to these criticisms.
2.  A CRASH-MERGE OF CULTURE AND ECONOMICS?
Two of the most trenchant critics, within cultural, media and communication 
studies, of the ‘simplistic narrative of the merging of culture and economics’ are Ni-
cholas Garnham (2005) and Toby Miller (2009; 2002).
Garnham’s critique centres on an extensive commentary on the core intellectual 
lineage of the information society and its fatal links to creative industries: Daniel 
Bell and post-industrialism, Schumpeterian theories of innovation, information 
economics; services and post-Fordism, and the ‘technologies of freedom’ argument 
of de Sola Pool. Creative industries ideas are a kind of Trojan Horse, secreting the 
intellectual heritage of the information society and its technocratic baggage into the 
realm of cultural practice, suborning the latter’s proper claims on the public purse 
and self-understanding, and aligning it with inappropriate bedfellows such as busi-
ness services, telecommunications and calls for increases in generic creativity. Garn-
ham rests his case on the normative imperative to return to the ‘cultural industries’ 
policy focus on distribution (critique of multimedia conglomeration) and con-
sumption (smoothing of the popular market for culture for access and equity) of 
which he was a main proponent in the 1980s (Garnham, 1997/1987).
Garnham is right to say that the creative industries idea is about linking cultu-
re to discourses of information, knowledge and innovation. He is wrong to assu-
me that the latter trumps the former in each and every case, or indeed that it has 
to be seen at all as a zero sum game. There are two key variations on Garnham as 
we look at the take-up of creative industries around the world. The first is a dra-
matic shift from an alleged top-down, central government-directed, triumpha-
lism. In almost all instances of its take-up elsewhere, it has been more tentative 
and exploratory, allowing for more regional variation, and adaptive to local cir-
cumstances. It is the very lack of certainty - despite Garnham’s ‘It assumes that we 
already know, and thus can take for granted, what the creative industries are, why 
they are important and thus merit supporting policy initiatives’ (Garnham, 2005, 
p. 16) ––that has meant constant definitional wrangling, regular recasting of what 
counts in the creative industries–– in general, a productive ferment, rather than 
preordained certainty.
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The second is that the ‘unquestioned prestige that now attaches to the informa-
tion society and to any policy that supposedly favours its development’ (Garnham, 
2005, p. 20) is quite unevenly engaged. When it is, it takes two forms. In the first, in 
developed countries, it is as much about softening the technocratic orientation of 
the information society as it is about taking the creative industries discourse beyond 
the cultural and media sector and into digital content and the creative economy 
fields. In the second, in the global south, it is to leverage support for the develop-
ment of basic infrastructure, the ‘unquestioned prestige’ of which absolutely cannot 
be taken for granted but it still very much in the process of being laid in. I identify 
four main global variations on the creative industries theme as it has travelled 
around the world in the US, Europe, Asia, and the global south, in the section of the 
paper ‘Policy adaptation: an international hegemony?’, below.
For Miller, the position of a critical cultural policy studies has become the ben-
chmark from which now to judge the extent to which a creative industries approach 
has fallen short of posture of an acceptable criticality. Miller is in concert with Garn-
ham in charging that creative industries is a ‘neo-liberal’ sell-out.  However for Mi-
ller the alternative is not necessarily a return to the cultural industries moment of 
the 1980s in the West, but a spatial displacement to what he regards as the exem-
plary cultural politics of Latin-American cultural activism.  He recommends pro-
grams of education and engagement through ‘the lens of subalternity and transterri-
torial as well as local social identities with an emphasis on cultural policy’. In a 
clarion call to remain ‘vibrantly independent’, Miller enjoins the cultural studies 
community to engage with social movements and their potentially positive articula-
tion to government rather than having any truck with corporate capital.
Such critiques are directed at the political or ideological implications of the 
creative industries discourse. It seems to me that the crude binary of an acceptable 
criticality and a posture of ‘neo-liberal’ capture prevents a productive engagement 
with the wide range of shades of ideological colour of governments, corporations, 
social movements and bureaucracies.  This is in part to take up what Garnham him-
self argued in the inaugural issue of the key journal Cultural Studies in the 1980s: 
most people’s cultural needs and aspirations are being ––for better or worse–– 
supplied by the market as goods and services. 
One way through this ideological stand-off is to focus on a key feature of creati-
ve industries discourse: an ‘enterprise’ approach to business development. This see-
ks to take account of the vast preponderance of small business or small business-like 
entities that populate the sector in most countries, and addresses what we might call 
the ‘economic subalterns’ in our midst.  This is a sector running on tight margins 
and facing high rates of failure, in need of flexible and in many cases experimental 
forms of state facilitation, and which rarely figures on governments’ cultural policy 
radar. The point is that much of the independent creative enterprises sector (games, 
design, web development, fashion, music, audiovisual) is organised in this way and 
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spans the commercial and the subvented, complicating the binary thinking that see-
ks to exclude the commercial from anything other than critique. Small business en-
terprise or entrepreneurship, and policies to support it, often has to run the gauntlet 
against much more powerful vested interests which I have nominated previously as 
Big Culture, Big Business and Big Government (Cunningham, 2002).
From this perspective, the limits of the cultural Marxist critique come into shar-
per relief. I would argue that the problems that capitalism gives rise to are not the 
result of the classic exercise of power and hegemony characteristic of the monopoly 
phase of capitalism, but of the ‘creative destruction’ of such a phase. Schumpeter’s 
famous phrase is reflective of Lash and Urry’s (1987) notion of ‘disorganised capita-
lism’, or of Robert Reich’s (2007) claim that large corporations have significantly 
less power now than three decades ago. 
The consequence is that there is a need to explore an economic ‘middle way’ in 
debates about the emergent nature of the creative economy, between the arts subsi-
dy and political economy models of the ‘narrative’ of the relationship between cul-
ture and economy. This involves a Schumpeterian emphasis on entrepreneurial or 
enterprise economics (Cunningham, Banks & Potts, 2008).  Schumpeter, in 1942 in 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, argued that Marx had ‘no adequate theory of 
enterprise’ and failed to ‘distinguish the entrepreneur from the capitalist’.  Schum-
peter ‘told of capitalism in the way most people experience it: as consumer desires 
aroused by endless advertising; as forcible jolts up and down the social pecking or-
der; as goals reached, shattered, altered, then reached once more as people try, try 
again’. He knew that ‘creative destruction fosters economic growth but also that it 
undercuts cherished human values.’ Schumpeter’s most recent biographer, Thomas 
McCraw, says that he elucidated what capitalism ‘really feels like’ (quoted in Mc-
Craw, 2007, p. 349; McCraw, 2007, p. 6). 
This approach gives us a better handle on what is happening at this present mo-
ment of challenge to the time-honoured models of production, dissemination and 
consumption in the media and cultural fields offered by new, mobile and interactive 
digital media and Internet-based modes of communication and distribution.  There 
is now a veritable wave of proposal, analysis and prognostication addressing this 
question. Chris Anderson (2006) and Mark Pesce (http://www.mindjack.com/featu-
re/piracy051305.html) exposit the limitations of the mass market mentality that can 
be addressed by Internet-based harvesting of the ‘long tail’ and exploitation of ‘hy-
perdistribution’. Charles Leadbeater (2008) explores diverse domains where the 
power of socially networked collective creation and communication are at work. 
Recent studies by Henry Jenkins (2006) and Yochai Benkler (2006) suggest that con-
sumers’ participation in new media production practice now generates significant 
economic and cultural value. Media production may be shifting from a closed in-
dustrial model towards a more open network in which consumers are now partici-
patory co-creators of media culture product. Henry Jenkins is careful to remind us 
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that this is not only a direct outcome of technology but a significant cultural pheno-
menon in which we’re seeing what happens when the means of cultural production 
and distribution are co-evolving between producer, aggregator and user. 
Rather than foreclose the question of how significant a challenge to business-as-
usual with the political economy nostrum that monopoly capitalism will always-al-
ready triumph, there is a need to explore new opportunities for content creation 
and distribution that arise in this turbulent space and explore new theories which 
attempt to deal with these new emergent realities.  
It is important to articulate, in the light of these critiques, a value orientation 
that connects theoretical debate to the practical domain of policy development. This 
might be summed up as: what are the policy frameworks that can assist emerging, as 
much as established and dominant, culture to thrive? Answering that question re-
quires a recognition that governments and state policy apparatuses are typically te-
chnocratic in their orientation, and controlling in the way that they interact with 
non-government players, including policy analysts ––and they must deal with well 
organised, effective big business lobbies, especially in the media and communica-
tions space. Policy and industry also often have little understanding of the dimen-
sions of social and cultural change in the sphere of cultural consumption and pro-
duction. Such change is posing increasingly large challenges for policy and industry 
today, and not only in the media and cultural fields. There is also a blurring of the 
previous structural boundaries between consumption and production of the old li-
near model on which pretty much all cultural, media and communication studies 
had relied. These burgeoning cultures clearly threaten big business models, as well 
as many professional production cadres, which usually depend on big business dis-
tributional clout to transmit their product to market.
These principles and insights can be informed by a value orientation of tracking 
and promoting cultural and social change that embraces consumer-citizen em-
powerment, while not perpetuating a doctrinaire divide between the consumer and 
citizen aspects of such empowerment. This position, of course, evokes the shades of 
many core debates in political economy and cultural studies. The work of John Fiske 
(1989), John Hartley (2002), Nicholas Garnham (1990), Peter Golding and Graeme 
Murdock (1997), and many others, are the reference points here about where the 
balance between the area of content and social agency, and the area of ownership, 
control and structure, exists. It is the nature of such foundational debates that they 
are not summarily resolved; indeed, they are usually structured as to be effectively 
unresolvable.
But the social and cultural policy point is to promote, and build, alignments of 
interest between small business enterprise cultures, the not-for-profit sector, state 
supported culture in the communication and cultural field, such as public service 
broadcasting and other elements, corporates committed to good citizenship, pro-
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gressive investment strategies and labour practices; and social or participatory DIY 
culture movements. 
The many critics of the creative industries concept see it as a kind of Trojan hor-
se, suborning the integrity of the case for support for culture through an untoward 
economism. It could, however, be viewed as opening up the hitherto ossified rela-
tion between economics and culture; a relationship no longer to be limited to ques-
tions of the arts and market failure (cultural economics), or of rationales for cultural 
regulation. Instead, there is a focus on the role of media, culture and communica-
tions in generating change and growth in what Schumpeter called the capitalist ‘en-
gine’. Engaging with the heterodox school of evolutionary economics (the intellec-
tual source of much innovation thinking) can, perhaps ironically, bring us back to 
many animating questions of our field ––what are the genuine advances in the com-
munications and media sectors (including aesthetic advances), how would we mea-
sure them, and what have been their impact? These are indeed questions of cultural 
value, from which the debates have rarely veered. 
Indeed, the appropriate relations between the economic and the cultural might 
be best traced as the evolution of cultural forms as social and industrial norms 
themselves evolve. The state developed a role, from mid-twentieth century, to ad-
dress market failure by asserting the ameliorating and elevating role of the arts (the 
values expressed in the arts can never, finally, be reconciled with those of the mar-
ket). It then engaged in regulation and support of what came to be dubbed the ‘cul-
tural’ industries (popular cultural value was significantly embodied in the products 
and services of these industries but they needed protection from the market’s leve-
lling of cultural value). Then the high relative growth in the creative sector led to 
‘creative industry’ development strategies based on the healthiness of traditional 
macroeconomic (GDP, employment, export growth) and microeconomic (enterpri-
se sustainability) indicators and the beginnings of the mainstreaming of cultural ac-
tivity in the knowledge-intensive services economy.  Then, the crisis in mass media 
business models and the rapid co-evolution of the market and household sectors 
(the pro-am revolution, social network markets, creativity as a social technology, 
contemporary innovation policy focused on creative human capital) suggests that 
addressing future potential sources of value creation and the nature and structure of 
future markets will have much to do with emergent cultural resources at the popula-
tion level. 
Each of these models of the relation of the cultural to the economic accretes and 
overlays the others in the contemporary situation. Each has an account of cultural 
value. Each stood in a critical relation to the dominant formations of their time, and 
each had, and has, a potentially emancipatory function.
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3.  COHERENCE AND THE QUESTION OF DATA
There is no question that definitional wrangling over what counts as creative 
industries has limited its uptake. There is almost exasperation in Simon 
Roodhouse’s survey of what he calls the ‘tortuous and contorted definitional his-
tory’ of the arts, cultural and creative industries (Roodhouse, 2001, p. 505). There 
are contending analytical and statistical categories such as copyright industries, 
content industries, cultural industries, digital content, the arts or entertainment 
industries, and more.  This category confusion means that it is difficult to gather 
accurate, authoritative and timely data about sectors and that it is subject to unfo-
cused analysis and intervention.  
A survey of the data challenges faced by the creative industries notes the ‘ex-
tremely difficult statistical measurement issues to overcome’ (Pattinson Consul-
ting, 2003, p. 6). These issues are part of the broader challenges of measuring 
effectively domains undergoing substantial change through the progressive con-
vergence of the computer, communication, cultural and content industries. This 
is the subject of a growing academic and policy literature (eg., Burns Owens Part-
nership et al, 2006; Pattinson Consulting, 2003; Pratt, 2000, 2004, 2008; Wyszo-
mirski, 2008). New hybrid occupations and industry sectors emerge that do not 
comfortably fit into standard statistics classifications. The 10–15 year gap between 
updates of these classification schemes means there is almost no comprehensive, 
standardised employment or industry data available during the critical emergence 
period of many sectors. Measuring the production and purchasing of physical 
products is difficult enough but measuring the number, size and value of the deli-
very of services is an order of magnitude more difficult. The challenges in seeking 
to measure the flow-on impact of emergent digital creative industries services to 
other sectors of the economy are even greater. 
Having readily conceded the degree of difficulty ––one faced by all jurisdictions, 
supra-, inter- and sub-national as well as national–– it must also be said that pro-
gress is being made on better data that is statistically robust and of value in the deve-
lopment of policy (see Higgs & Cunningham, 2008). Productive effort has been 
made at the intergovernmental level at organizations such as the United Nations 
Educational, Science & Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). At the 
national level, there have been substantial mapping exercises in the UK, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, France and in other locations at the sub-natio-
nal and local levels. Specific sectors of the creative industries have been the focus of 
concerted work to map their size and impact on the wider economy (for example, 
design in Ontario, Victoria, New Zealand and the UK).[1] And at the cutting edge 
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of policy-relevant data analytics, there is progress being made on defining the ‘crea-
tive economy’, which can be taken to mean the contribution which the creative 
workforce and/or the creative industries sectors themselves are making to their na-
tional or regional economies (Higgs, Cunningham & Bakhshi, 2008; Higgs, Cun-
ningham & Pagan, 2007; Bakhshi, McVittie & Simmie, 2008).
The data challenges faced by policy makers and analysts seeking to grasp the 
size, growth rates, economic impact and links with the wider economy of the creati-
ve industries are an integral part of the productive ferment evidenced as economies 
and societies undergo rapid change due to digitisation, convergence, the growth of 
knowledge-intensive services and services-based economies more generally. The 
very difficulties are themselves an indicator of significance.
4.  PRECARIOUS LABOUR
A robust and burgeoning literature has developed recently around the notion of 
precarious labour-much of it focussed on the specific condition of ‘creative labour’ 
(for example: McRobbie, 2002; Terranova, 2004; Deuze, 2007; Scholz, 2008; Rossi-
ter, 2007; Gill & Pratt, 2008; Ross, 2002, 2006, 2009). This debate has largely been 
conducted in the mode of a wide-ranging ideology critique. Criticisms of the presu-
med overly-celebratory accounts of the increased significance of creative labour in 
contemporary economies have focussed on so-called neoliberal concepts of human 
capital and of labour which inform such panglossian endorsements of glamorous 
and attractive, but volatile and precarious, forms of work. 
Indeed, in his panoramic overview of the state of play in media and cultural stu-
dies, Toby Miller (2010) characterises the future of these disciplines as lying in just 
such a focus on labour. Characterising the dominant paradigms as ‘misleadingly 
functionalist on its effects and political-economy side’, and ‘misleadingly conflictual 
on its active-audience side’, Miller argues that.
Work done on audience effects and political economy has neglected struggle, 
dissonance, and conflict in favour of a totalizing narrative in which the media domi-
nate everyday life. Work done on active audiences has over-emphasized struggle, 
dissonance, and conflict, neglecting infrastructural analysis in favour of a totalizing 
narrative in which consumers dominate everyday life (2010, p. 50). 
Miller’s third mode should ‘should synthesize and improve’ the dominant para-
digms by its analytical concentration on the status of labour. He reminds us in the 
most ringing of tones, ‘There would be no culture, no media, without labour. La-
bour is central to humanity’ (2010, p. 50).
It is not hard to see why this focus has developed. It goes to the heart of 
Marxism’s theory of labour as surplus value. This analysis, based on increasing im-
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miseration of the masses through decreasing returns to scale, and so powerful in the 
mid-nineteenth century when the industrial revolution was wreaking its greatest 
‘creative destruction’, has not largely been borne out. While later versions of Marxist 
analysis have theorised immiseration being pushed out firstly to the imperial world’s 
colonies, then more generally to the developing world, the labour force in the deve-
loped West have largely benefitted from the growth of the capitalist ‘pie’. It is there-
fore essential for that theory that aggregate improvements in the conditions for la-
bour be interrogated to reveal their hitherto hidden precarity.
Studies of the creative workforce undertaken by the Centre which I direct place 
these matters in an empirical frame.[2] Broadly speaking, the nature of work in the 
cultural, media and communication fields are typical of much knowledge work to-
day. It is characterised by the increasing occurrence of contract labour requiring 
high degrees of mobility, by multiple career pathways, by increasingly global oppor-
tunities and challenges, and by the diminution of the market organiser roles played 
by many large (often public sector) agencies in mentoring, apprenticeship and 
structured whole-of-career pathways for creative workers. In most cases, ‘learning-
by-doing’ apprenticeship opportunities, such as these organisations used to provide, 
have declined significantly.
Certainly the creative workforce is distinctive along some key axes. I will use 
some Australian data to illustrate this. Across all people employed in the Austra-
lian creative industries at the 2006 Census, for example,12% are sole-practitioners 
compared to 7% overall for all other service industries. 60% of employment in the 
industry classification for Creative Artists, Musicians, Writers & Performers is 
self-employment. There are four other creative industries sectors having self-em-
ployment rates twice the average: photography, craft jewellery, music (and other 
sound recording activities) and other specialised design services. 
This might support claims for distinctive precarity, but other findings complica-
te such a picture. Compared with other employment, particularly in the traditional 
professions, creative employment disproportionately occurs outside the creative in-
dustries themselves. In other words, creatively trained people are more likely to be 
working outside the specialist creative industry sectors than inside them, and this is 
the case in most countries, and has been the case for a long time. As we have seen, 
the degree of embeddedness is greatest in the many ‘design’ occupations: 60% of the 
employment for design occupations in Australia occurs outside of specialist design 
industry sectors. 
As we have seen in the Australian data, while there has been a slowing of growth 
between 2001 and 2006, when viewed over a longer time period, the creative indus-
tries have grown at a significantly faster pace than the aggregate economy. The Cen-
tre for International Economics (CIE, 2009, p. 7) has shown that, over the eleven 
years to 2007-08, the creative industries expanded at an average annual rate of 5.8 
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per cent, compared to average GDP growth of 3.6 per cent over that period. Growth 
is spread across a broad range of industry sectors (there are more creatives emplo-
yed outside the creative industries than inside them), and creatives are well paid (all 
segments are above the national average except for music and performing arts). 
Outside these studies, it has also been established that creative workforce has a signi-
ficantly higher level of formal qualification than the workforce as a whole.
If we can generalise at all from these data, it would be to conclude that the crea-
tive workforce shares a number of the characteristics of knowledge workers genera-
lly. While it may be somewhat distinctive in the degree of ‘flexibility’ seen in its la-
bour market, creatives are also generally remunerated well for their services (which 
significantly complicates the picture usually painted about creative workers based 
on the typicality of the independent artist), and have ‘options’ and mobility due to 
their qualification levels and experience in project-based work. However, this, as we 
saw in the discussion of the arts trident, in no way obviates the need to address the 
endemic problems of artists’ incomes.
A more holistic picture of precarity in contemporary labour would balance these 
characteristics of the creative workforce against the problems faced by those working 
in sectors with declining demand for labour (agriculture), or faced with major restruc-
turing due to long-term challenges like climate change (mining), or face exploitation 
due to low qualification-and-wage structures (migrant labour, piece workers, low 
wage service sectors).  It is arguable that these sectors of the workforce face a much 
more precarious future than do creatives. In addition, our studies suggest that em-
bedded creatives do not generally exhibit the profiles attributed to creative labour by 
the precarity school of critical media and cultural studies. A great many creatives, we 
must assume, have managed precarity by working outside the creative industries.
I believe that the debate about precarious labour has deep implications for peda-
gogy in our disciplinary field. It seems to me to be a matter of core pedagogical ethics 
to refine critical stances in the disciplinary traditions in cultural, media and communi-
cations studies traditions to take account of vocational aspirations, workplace trends 
and the broader structure of the economy into which students will be moving and will 
be looking for career opportunities.  Engaging students in the nature of work and la-
bour, involving the exploration of the notion of the portfolio career, self employment, 
and the expected multiplicity of career directions in any one person’s working life, es-
pecially in these fields, is sine qua non. There must be a balance between a ‘glass half 
full’ and ‘glass half empty’ analytics.  The conditions of precarious labour, which is a 
growing focus of research in critical communication studies, needs to be addressed as 
a current reality, neither to be celebrated nor critiqued tout court. 
The key textbook in the creative industries field is edited by a team led by John 
Hartley (2005). Along with the more celebratory or dispassionate analytics, the book 
features Angela McRobbie on exclusionary employment trends in the creative in-
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dustries, Toby Miller and colleagues on some of the lessons on the politics of labour 
to be learned from their study of global Hollywood, as well as the links of the creati-
ve industries discourse to social movement politics (Graham Meikle, Geert Lovink) 
and multiculturalism (Canclini). It might equally have featured Andrew Ross (2002, 
2006) on the exploitative nature of labour in the new economy. 
However, much of the critique of labour conditions in the creative industries 
(and other areas of knowledge-intensive services) carries a little-examined presump-
tion that conditions in the past were clearly superior and that it should be possible 
to return to such conditions ––if only the dynamics of global political economy 
could be done away with.  But I don’t think the toothpaste can be squeezed back 
into the tube, the egg unscrambled. The nature of work in the cultural, media and 
communication fields, as fields typical of much knowledge work today, are charac-
terised by the increasing occurrence of contract labour, by multiple career pathways, 
by increasingly global opportunities and challenges, and by the diminution of the 
market organiser roles played by many large (often public sector) agencies in men-
toring, apprenticeship and structured whole-of-career pathways for creative wor-
kers. In most cases, ‘learning-by-doing’ apprenticeship opportunities, such as these 
organisations used to provide, have declined significantly. 
Critique of precarious labour strikes me as a bit like David Gauntlett’s (2000; 
and see Gauntlett & Horsley, 2005) acerbic point about media studies academics be-
latedly discovering what has been obvious to their student populations for some 
time about online worlds. It seems to me that building into cultural, media and 
communications studies curricula the analytical and practical skills (including ‘left’ 
knowledge and skills about rights at work and critical knowledge of corporate citi-
zenship or lack of it, for example, and ‘right’ knowledge and confidence of global 
‘creative class’ opportunities) is a self-evidently necessary balance between critique 
and vocational realism.
5.  POLICY ADAPTATION: AN INTERNATIONAL HEGEMONY?
I have earlier referred to Garnham’s charge of hegemonic truimphalism in the 
creative industries discourse: ‘It assumes that we already know, and thus can take for 
granted, what the creative industries are, why they are important and thus merit 
supporting policy initiatives’ (Garnham, 2005, p. 16). However, when looked at 
more closely, in almost all instances of its take-up elsewhere, it has been more tenta-
tive and exploratory, allowing for more regional variation, and adaptive to local cir-
cumstances. Rather than a Trojan horse, it might be better thought of as a Rors-
chach blot, being invested in form varying reasons and with varying emphases and 
outcomes. Policy discourse, particularly that which has travelled so extensively so 
quickly as creative industries, will inevitably assemble differing evidence bases, inter-
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ests and explanatory schema. (I have called this ‘ideas-thick’ rather than ‘ideas-rich’ 
language (Cunningham, 1992, p. 35).) It is the interactions amongst the contending 
elements that determine whether a policy discourse can be said to have useful or de-
leterious effects ––effects which should not be presumed in advance.
We can broadly identify several global variations on the creative industries the-
me as it has travelled around the world.[3] In the United States, the broad sectoral 
field embraced by the UK definition remains resolutely divided into arts and culture 
on the one hand and the entertainment/copyright industries on the other. Wyszo-
mirski reminds us that the US’ paradigmatic hegemony in entertainment exists nor-
matively at the national level, while at the regional, state and local level, policies to 
support the creative industries struggle for space and acceptance as in most other 
countries. She shows that the debates around the creative industries (which many 
have assumed have not been needed or noticed in the US) have begun to make their 
mark: a language at once more focused than culture as a whole way of life but much 
broader than the traditional arts has effected a significant change in policy thinking 
‘from a resource poor, cost diseased sector in need of subsidy to a set of community 
assets that can be engines of local development’ (2008, p. 203). The impetus for the 
adaptation of the creative industries idea, then, has come from the subsidised arts 
end of the spectrum and is resolutely sub-national in its implementation. This focus 
is often found combined with place-based, regional and municipal development 
strategies inspired by the work of Richard Florida (2002).
As a generalisation, European variations on the creative industries tend to stress 
a greater degree of communitarian benefit and strategies of social inclusion than is 
evident in the original UK settings. When ICT is considered in this context, it is its 
social and cultural uptake as much as its potential as an economic driver, that recei-
ves attention. The European Commission’s (2006) major study The Economy of 
Culture in Europe, explores the links between culture, creativity and innovation. 
Much of its emphasis is that cultural development serves as a tool of social integra-
tion and territorial cohesion. The tensions lie between city re-birthing strategies, UK 
creative economy discourse, and the deep cultural heritage of European regions, not 
around the prestige of the information society. While the latter is certainly in evi-
dence at the level of the major supranational policy bureaux (European Commis-
sion, European Union, OECD), this kind of policy development is not, and cannot 
be, as directive (‘top down’) as central government creative industries policy and 
programs enacted in the UK.
Many Asian nations have adopted the idea of creative industries in ways that 
have definitively delivered it out of its Anglospheric embrace. Kong, Gibson, Khoo 
and Semple’s (2006) careful tracing of the way creative industries discourse has been 
adapted to the local contexts of China, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan, China and India shows that creative industries works in intermittent, 
sometimes incoherent or contradictory ways, and emphasises especially the role of 
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national socio-economic and political circumstances. This, arguably, is a sign of dy-
namism, not of a failure to attain the standards of a Platonic ideal of a rational-com-
prehensive policy model. In the light of Garnham’s argument, only Hong Kong ex-
plicitly includes software and computing as a key sector of the creative industries. In 
Singapore, for example, the discourse has been used to begin to displace, or at least 
supplement, the prestige of ICT ––which has hitherto held unquestioned sway in a 
city state known for its normative technocracy. ‘Creative industries’ has come to 
mean a quite radical emphasis on creative thinking and problem solving and a cha-
llenge to time honoured Confucian educational models and an new inscription of 
the prestige of the artistic endeavour.
The creative industries discourse in the global South is one which must engage 
with cultural heritage, poverty alleviation and basic infrastructure, as preconditions 
for gaining leverage. In the global south, the discourse can be used to leverage sup-
port for the development of basic infrastructure, both cultural and ICT ––the ‘un-
questioned prestige’ of the latter absolutely cannot be taken for granted. It is to these 
regions that UN agencies like UNESCO, WIPO, UNCTAD, and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) for South-South Cooperation devote their atten-
tion. UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions and its international initiative the Global Alliance for Cultural 
Diversity positions the creative industries as ‘vehicles of cultural identity that play an 
important role in fostering cultural diversity’ (UNESCO and Global Alliance 2005). 
UNCTAD and UNDP’s mission of poverty alleviation through enhanced trade op-
portunity relies on procrustean and inalienable creative human capital as the funda-
mental economic driver. This much is made clear in the comparisons between deve-
loped and developing (most particularly the least developed) countries in the most 
recent major Creative Economy Report 2010 from the UN agencies tasked with trac-
king economic development opportunities for the developing world (UN 2010).
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rather than a Trojan Horse, the creative industries idea might be better thought 
of as a Rorschach blot, given its evolution from sector-specific mapping to eco-
nomy-wide focus on creative inputs as generative of change and innovation, and its 
differing emphases and take-up in different regions over the last ten years. Rather 
than as a rational-comprehensive Platonic policy critic inveighing against inconsis-
tency and incoherence, we might see in the discourse evidence of creative ferment as 
policy language tries to grasp both production and consumption in new economic 
conditions. Rather than fading out after the Blairite Cool Britannia ‘spring’, ten 
years on, the idea has evolved and spread: its take-up in economic powerhouses in 
Asia, its reframing around the ‘creative economy’, and its translation into UN agen-
cy-speak, suggest that its teenage years will be rambunctious.
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